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Book Review of Forgiveness and
Revenge, by Trudy Govier.
Margaret Urban Walker
Arizona State University

Forgiveness and Revenge. By Trudy Govier. London and New York:
Routledge, 2002. Pp. 205. $80.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Forgiveness and revenge are everyday stuff, in reality and
fantasy. Reckoning with wrongs, however, has in recent years been
the aim of large scale political projects. These projects include
tribunals for war crimes and crimes against humanity, truth
commissions that seek to establish a common and authoritative story
in the wake of political violence, or reparations movements that seek
apology, restitution, or material compensation for losses that have
befallen groups of people due to genocide, conquest, oppression,
forced migration, theft of land, or the knowing destruction of cultures.
Whether the injuries and the actors are individual or collective, some
common questions occur, even if answers might differ in personal and
political cases. Must those who do wrong be punished? Does
wrongdoing of certain kinds or magnitudes preclude reconciliation of
offenders and those injured? Can only injured parties forgive? Can
groups forgive or be forgiven? Does forgiveness depend on the
acknowledgment and repentance of wrongdoers? Are some acts
unforgivable? These questions, in their philosophical, practical, and
political forms have produced a steady stream of recent writing about
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the ethical, legal, and political processes through which human beings
come to terms with humanly inflicted loss and those who inflict it.
Govier, the author of other widely read philosophical books on
social trust, focuses in this book on the opposing alternatives of
forgiving and getting even by seeking to understand their emotional,
moral, and practical dimensions. She is not neutral between the
alternatives. Rather, this book is an extended and persistent plea for
the moral, psychological, and practical superiority of forgiveness and
reconciliation rather than resentment and revenge, and of constructive
vindication of victims rather than vindictiveness. She presses us to
examine complacency about the naturalness and inevitability of needs
to “get even,” skepticism about human capacities for compassion and
transformation, and tendencies of individuals and groups to enjoy the
moral high ground of victimhood without acknowledging their own
wrongdoing to others. Lucid, lively, clearly reasoned and plainly
written, Govier’s book is filled with concrete examples drawn from
everyday life and politics.
The book begins with an argument against revenge, and a
caution not to conflate revenge and retribution. Practically, personal
revenge tends to be exaggerated in its enactment, unreliable in its
results, anarchic in its applications. It is hard for those injured to know
when to stop, or to foresee whether scores will be settled or new
rounds of vengeance initiated. Revenge is easily misdirected at, or
destructive to, third parties who may be blameless. Govier’s main
objection to revenge, however, is that it necessarily seeks “satisfaction
at having brought about the suffering of another human being” (p. 1),
and intentionally seeking the suffering of someone for one’s own
satisfaction is accepting and cultivating an evil desire, one that is
incompatible with respect for persons. Throughout the book, Govier
relies on this minimal neo-Kantian moral premise, which is discussed
in a very brief appendix (along with another brief appendix that
consider what religious traditions say about forgiveness). Govier also
cuts off legitimation for revenge through its links to retribution.
Retribution can plausibly be explained as “sending a message” through
the unpleasantness inflicted on a wrongdoer, without any intention
that the suffering thereby caused be caused in order to satisfy other
parties. Govier concludes the argument with the story of Samuel Pisar,
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 43, No. 2 (June 2003): pg. 252-254. DOI. This article is © Philosophy
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette.
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center.

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

an Auschwitz survivor who was not vindictive but who “vindicated”
himself by a lifetime’s devotion to human rights and international law.
If retribution sends a message of vindication, that is enough; if there
are ways for victims to receive or achieve vindication without
retribution, perhaps that is enough, too.
Ambiguity lingers on the question of the moral acceptability or
desirability of retribution. Govier rejects revenge, while detaching
retribution from it and suggesting that non-retributive vindication of
victims is best. In a brief paragraph Govier offers without comment
Jean Hampton’s view that punishment vindicates a victim’s worth (p.
19), and later says without elaboration that she has not rejected “the
retributive claim that wrongdoers deserve to suffer” (p. 40). One
wonders, if wrongdoers deserve to suffer, is someone obliged to see
that they do? It takes an argument either way, and Govier does not
offer one. Instead, the book’s argument is wholly in favor of
restorative and conciliative approaches to wrongdoing. The issue about
“hard dealing” with offenders resurfaces later and is joined by another,
more troubling ellipsis, to which I return below.
Govier adopts a fairly standard conception of forgiveness as a
process that involves “overcoming resentment” and explores “bilateral
forgiveness” as a kind of best case. In bilateral forgiveness a
wrongdoer is repentant, acknowledges wrongdoing, and offers apology
and amends, which helps the offended party to relinquish anger and
rebuild trust, thus making reconciliation or conciliatory attitudes
possible. But Govier (wisely) resists the idea the reconciliation is
essential to forgiveness, instead seeing forgiveness as a process that
can free the one injured from the burdens of resentment and can even
prompt contrition in offenders who do not make the first move. In the
chapters on forgiveness, including one that defends the claim that
groups can be injured and that groups can forgive, many basic but
helpful distinctions (forgiving and excusing; forgiving and condoning;
forgiving and forgetting; bilateral, mutual, and one-sided forgiveness;
primary and secondary victims) are installed with striking examples,
such as Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, the responses of a
murder victim’s family, outrage surrounding former President Reagan’s
controversial visit to Bitburg where Waffen SS officers are buried.
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The second half of the book is the more challenging, morally
and practically, as Govier explores what we might call (but she does
not) the limits of forgiveness. Here occur some of the most
provocative questions: about what is unforgivable, about human
character and possibility, about choice and accountability. Govier
ponders “unforgivability” in moral rather than factual terms but initially
transmutes the question of what is forgivable into a practical one:
even in the face of monstrous deeds, people sometimes have no
alternative to building a continuing life together. But Govier then
unfolds a position on the redeemability of wrongdoers that is optimistic
in its insistence on robust possibilities for moral improvement or
transformation even in the darkest cases. Near the end of a chapter
titled “Monstrous deeds, not monstrous people” she sums up
concisely: “We should never give up on another human being” (p.
140).
These chapters are really the heart of the book, in both senses.
Govier recognizes that practically and politically reconciliation with
wrongdoers is not always possible or safe, yet she suggests that such
resolutions are always to be sought and favored to the extent possible
as a matter of moral principle. While not denying that some individuals
will not repent or reform, she argues for “a kind of secular faith” (p.
137) which requires “a fundamentally hopeful and respectful attitude
toward persons,” renouncing the idea that “some human beings are so
much moral garbage, worthy only of being discarded” (p. 138).
Persons, not deeds, however monstrous, are the objects of
forgiveness; to hold a person unforgivable is to deny that person’s
capacity for significant moral change (pp. 119–20). The alternative,
correct in Govier’s view, is belief in “the universal possibility of moral
transformation” (p. 120). While Govier believes this commitment can
be defended on moral grounds of respect for persons alone, she
buttresses the moral position with some lessons from social
psychology. Human beings impute too much to character and not
enough to situation, and tend to fall for The Myth of Pure Evil (p. 125)
that ignores the uncertainties and ambiguities in human beings’
motivations and their vulnerability to luck. She offers a rather quick
argument that attempts to close up the conceptual space in which
responsible agents choose what is bad out of true depravity or
hopeless indifference: if people are responsible at all, it is because
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they remain capable of choice, and hence in principle of change. If
they are incapable of change, then they are pathologically rigid, and so
not subject to judgments of responsibility at all (pp. 122–25).
Here the author’s faith in moral transformation is stretched as
thin as that argument. Govier’s case for the bare possibility of moral
transformation in human beings does not connect with the need for
personal, social, penal, and political practices in which we do,
individually and collectively, have to deal with individuals who are
dangerous, unpredictable, and perhaps borderline in capacities for
responsibility. If their track records and stable traits do not suggest
more than logical possibilities of transformation, do we necessarily
treat them as “moral garbage” if we make sure they face unpleasant
consequences for their actions, and put a priority on the well-being
and safety of others? Reckoning with people retributively in measured,
humane, and consistent ways is arguably affirming our respect for
their agency, rather than denying it. The author’s early silence on the
acceptability or desirability of retribution here returns as a question
about what it makes sense, morally, prudentially, and practically, to do
with very “bad” actors. For all who are absorbed by these perennial
issues that are always as timely as the most recent personal betrayal,
criminal violence, or political atrocity, Govier’s persistent defense of
forgiveness and fresh starts is a demanding exercise in a highly
readable form.
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